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Abstract 
 
 
I examine the profitability of hedge fund short trades in Finnish equities. I also study short 
selling strategies producing abnormally high risk-adjusted returns. I do this by combining 
Finnish financial supervisory authority’s (FIN-FSA) data about short positions that are over 
0.5% of the underlying company’s market cap with the companies’ return and returns of the 
factor portfolios. The factor portfolios used are Fama and French 3 and Carhart momentum. 
I find that hedge funds’ short trades are able to significantly outperform the market by 7 to 
13 percent annually. I also divide the funds by their strategy depending on the amount of 
view they want to take on an individual company. I find that the funds that generally do not 
implement stock picking strategies, such as systematic equity strategies do not produce 
significant positive alphas. However, large wealth management companies’ funds are able to 
produce high positive alphas, as are the funds that generally exploit stock picking strategies, 
such as dedicated short funds. 
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Abbreviations 
 
BAB = Betting against beta 
 
FF3 = Fama and French 3-factor model 
 
FIN-FSA = Finnish financial supervisory authority 
 
HML = High minus low 
 
MKTRF = Market excess return 
 
MOM, WML = Momentum 
 
OMXH = OMX Helsinki stock exchange 
 
RF = Risk free 
 
SE = Standard error 
 
SMB = Small minus big 
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1 Introduction 
 
I examine hedge fund short trade returns between different strategies and also as a whole. I also study 
whether the magnitude of the short position affects its performance. My research contributes to a 
field of studies made about short interest, and also about the performance of hedge funds. I follow the 
approach of Rapach et al. (2016) indicating that short positions are a strong predictor of the stock 
market, which also implies that short sellers are sophisticated and more informative than traders on 
average about the future market movements. This is also in line with the theory that short sellers are 
able to “take advantage of arbitrage opportunities” and “cause prices to revert to their fundamentals” 
that is stated by Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and Stambaugh et al. (2012). The abnormal performance 
of hedge funds has been recognized by Agarwal and Naik (1999) and Stefanova et al. (2014). It has 
also been argued that hedge funds’ outperformance is insignificant (Griffin and Xu, 2009) and that 
rational hedge funds do not always stabilize the prices to their fundamentals, as seen in the 
technology bubble, which was studied by Brunnermeier and Nagel (2004). 
I study three questions: Firstly, are short traders able to find overvalued companies and make 
significant risk-adjusted alpha with their short trades. Secondly, which strategies are able to beat the 
market and the average short trade and thirdly, are larger short positions more informative than the 
average short trade. Until the 2010’s the research about short trades has been, mostly due to data 
restrictions, about aggregate short interest and its predictive power on future returns. In these papers 
it has been found that short sellers are able to predict future negative returns (Aitken et al., 1998; 
Diether et al., 2009; Boehmer et al., 2008). It has also been found that the advantage of short sellers 
comes from the skill to analyse public information successfully (Engelberg et al., 2012). However, 
there have not been many studies about individual short trades and it has not been possible to identify 
the short seller, since the data has not been available.  In 2016 Stephan Jank and Esad Smajlbegovic 
used the new EU data of short positions to find that hedge funds are able to generate high risk-
adjusted alphas with the Fama and French (1993) three-factor risk adjustment. They however did not 
study the performance on a fund strategy level, but mostly as a whole set and with divisions like is 
the short seller domestic or foreign. 
Also Choi et al. (2016) have looked into the short interest of hedge funds. They divided their data to 
hedge fund and non-hedge fund managers, and found out that short duration short trades executed by 
hedge funds are much more profitable than the ones that non-hedge funds execute. However, there 
are problems with the quality of their data due to hedge funds reporting incorrectly on 13F reports 
which Choi et al. use. These problems are specified in the paper of Agarwal et al. (2013). 
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It seems that most of these studies have come to a conclusion that hedge funds are able to outperform 
mutual funds and the average investor and that hedge funds are informed investors. Hedge funds 
making abnormal returns is in line with the theory of informed traders (Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980) 
which suggests that arbitrage returns should be made to compensate the cost of gathering 
information. My research will contribute to these earlier studies by showing how short trades perform 
in Finland, studying which kind of hedge fund strategies are able to outperform the market with their 
short trades and examining if the magnitude of the short trade correlates with its return. This shows 
us which kind of hedge funds are more informative than the average trader, but also which kind of 
hedge funds’ short positions other investors should monitor when building their own portfolios and 
whether the magnitude of the short trade includes information about the stock’s future return. 
 
2 Research question and hypotheses 
 
I study the risk-adjusted returns that hedge funds are able to produce and investigate if they are able 
to significantly outperform the market. I also compare the hedge funds with each other with division 
between strategies. The theory around this study suggests that informative traders should be able to 
exploit arbitrage opportunities to cover the costs from gathering information (Grossman and Stiglitz, 
1980). It has been suggested that hedge funds are these informative arbitrageurs (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1997). This theory also seems to work in practice; Jank and Smajlbegovic (2016) studied the 
European data, and found out that hedge funds are able to outperform the market significantly. 
Considering these information, my first alternative hypothesis can be formulated as: 
 
1) Hedge funds are on average informed traders, and they are able to outperform the market 
and produce abnormally high risk-adjusted returns with their short positions. 
 
There also may be a difference in the performance of different hedge fund strategies. Funds that 
employ stock picking strategies, like dedicated short funds, might be able to produce higher returns 
than the ones that do not employ them.  This is again based on the theory of informed traders 
(Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980) which states that the investors should be paid in relation to the 
information they gather, and it is likely that dedicated short funds gather the most information about 
short selling opportunities. Therefore my second alternative hypothesis is formulated as: 
 
2) Hedge funds that employ stock picking strategies are even more informed traders who are 
able to outperform the market as well as the average hedge fund with their short positions. 
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3 Data and methodology 
 
I join data from four major sources: Firstly, short positions are from FIN-FSA’s data, which gathers 
all short positions that are over 0.5% of the underlying company’s market cap on a daily level. 
Secondly, daily return data comes from Thomson Reuters. I collect daily return data for my time 
period for all companies that were sold short on that period. I use a time period between 2012 and 
2017 due to the short position data being available for just that period. Thirdly, daily factor portfolio 
data from Europe comes from Kenneth French’s data library and includes the risk-free return (ܴܨ), 
small minus big (ܵܯܤ ), high minus low (ܪܯܮ ) and winner minus loser momentum (ܯܱܯ ) 
portfolios. As the market excess return (ܯܭܴܶܨ) I use the Finnish return index from Thomson 
Reuters. The Finnish return index is chosen since my data is Finnish. Fourthly, I use the Lipper-Tass 
hedge fund database. I use this database when it is possible to sort the funds to groups by their 
strategies. 
3.1      Short data from FIN-FSA 
This data became available in late 2012 when the EU adopted Article 9 of Regulation No 236/2012. 
This article wants to make short positions inside the EU transparent and obligates all investors to 
disclose short positions over 0.5% of shares outstanding. The short position also has to be reported 
whenever it surpasses a threshold of 0.1% after this 0.5%, so when it exceeds 0.6%, 0.7% etc. 
Another interesting fact about this data is that every time when the position goes under this 0.5% 
after achieving it, it should also be reported. This makes it possible to calculate the real return of the 
deal, and this is what Jank and Smajlbegovic have done with their data from the whole EU region. 
These attributes have also created problems in the data. I notice that from many countries, the data 
only shows a few closed positions. For example in Finland there were about 4 000 deals, and the data 
shows only a few hundred closed positions. It is highly unlikely that all short sellers would carry their 
positions even for years, which implies that the data does not have all the closed positions in it. 
Therefore I test the deals to have multiple durations. For every deal I calculate returns for a day, a 
week, a month, three months, six months, a year and two years. Therefore the return is not calculated 
with the real closing date. 
Another consideration about this data is the fact about the notifications made about the 0.1% 
threshold surpasses. This can make my data show the same short trade twice. Let’s think about an 
example: If company A is first sold short by Fund B on 1.1.2016 by the amount of 0.5% and then on 
2.1.2016 the amount is 0.6%, the data treats this as a significant new short position, which it might 
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not be. I study the data, and it seems that no real short positions were triggered twice within a week 
in the same stock by the same fund. However, in a month’s time range, there were already real short 
positions in the same stock from the same fund, and it is highly unlikely that hedge funds would 
make two deals based on the same information with such a long time between them. I might also be 
calculating yearly returns for the same stock for consecutive dates. This makes it so that the two 
observations are highly correlated with each other, since they have 249/250 dates in common with 
each other. To take care of this I decide to cluster the data when the following applies: Firstly, the 
underlying stock is the same and secondly, the short trades are executed within the same week. I 
decide to use this time period because of the possibility for the funds to open a short position more 
than one time within a month with completely different information. I also delete all under 0.5% 
positions from the data, since they should show the close of the short position, but they are not 
adequately reported in the data to be used for that. 
3.2 Daily return data from Thomson Reuters 
I gather daily returns for all 40 companies that were sold short in Finland during 2012 to 2017 
according to the FIN-FSA data. Then I calculate the returns for all durations and for all companies 
using this daily data. I make two adjustments to make the data consistent. First, I delete all days in 
which more than 90% of these companies do not have data on the returns, so I handle those days as 
non-trading days. Second, I delete the data with stock prices under 0.1EUR. This takes care of 
illiquidity issues, like with Talvivaara’s stock after its trading was ceased. Otherwise the data would 
show zero-returns due to lack of liquidity.  
3.3 Daily factor portfolio data from Kenneth French data library 
I gather the daily factor portfolio data from Kenneth French’s data library and calculate the returns 
for all the durations I use for all the factor portfolios. The data includes risk free return, small minus 
big excess return, high minus low excess return and winner minus loser momentum excess return. 
Here I use the European level data. I take the market return data from Thomson Reuters as Finnish 
return index, since the companies I am observing are all Finnish. After this I deduct the risk free 
return from the market return and companies’ returns to get the market and firm specific excess 
returns. These are then combined with the factor portfolios’ excess return data to get the right, day 
level forward looking returns for all the required factors. 
Performance of hedge fund short trades in the Finnish stock market Juho Kiiski 
 
5 
3.4      Hedge fund strategies from Lipper-Tass database 
I construct hedge fund strategy groups with the help of Lipper-Tass hedge fund database. I have 140 
funds in my data as short sellers for which I gather their strategies from the Lipper-Tass database 
when it is possible. The ones that are not found in there, I handpick from the fund’s website or either 
from Thomson Reuters or Bloomberg. I use the following division with the fund groups, starting 
from the one that employs stock picking strategies the least and ending to the one that uses them the 
most: Group 1 includes the funds that use a convertible arbitrage strategy. These funds do not usually 
employ stock picking strategies. I get one fund and two short positions in this group, so I drop the 
group from further examination. Group 2 includes systematic equity strategies. Their stock picking 
does not have to include information on the underlying company’s performance in relation to the 
market. I got 18 funds in this group with a few hundred short positions. Group 3 is for the funds that I 
could not reliably put to any of the other strategy groups. This group includes mostly (over 90%) 
large financial companies’ funds which can employ any strategy, like Goldman Sachs and Morgan 
Stanley funds, but also a few funds that were so resistant to tell their strategies that it was not 
possible to put them in any of the other groups. There are 70 funds and over 1 800 deals in this 
sample. In group 4 I have long-short equity strategies that do employ a stock picking strategy, but 
also short sell with a reason to filter away the market risk from their strategies. Here I have 41 funds 
and over a thousand deals. Group 5 is for dedicated short strategies that employ stock picking 
strategies the most, and should make their profits with the individual stock picks. I have 9 funds and 
about 80 deals in this sample.  
3.5      Descriptive data 
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics. It seems that the average short trade is able to be more profitable 
than short selling the market when the deal’s duration is over one month, but not itself be profitable 
(able to produce positive returns) at any duration. This implies that most of these hedge funds would 
use a long-short strategy, which I cannot validate, since I do not have the information about the long 
side trades. The use of long-short strategies is however supported by the distribution of strategies 
from the Lipper-Tass database, Thomson Reuters and Bloomberg. 
When looking at the largest short positions’ sample it seems that the funds here are able to pick deals 
better than the average hedge fund on a very short or a very long duration, but they will also require a 
long-short strategy to be profitable. This implies that large short positions might contain information 
about the really short term or really long term performance of the underlying company. This 
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outperformance of largest positions is also in line with the theory (Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980) and 
empirics (Jank and Smajlbegovic, 2016). 
It seems that systematic equity is unable to beat the average deal, or even seems to lose to it. This is 
in line with the theory and my hypothesis; the funds that are not using stock picking information do 
not make arbitrage profits. Large wealth management companies’ funds seem to beat the market on 
almost all of the durations, but these funds also require a long-short strategy to be profitable. Perhaps 
surprisingly, long-short equity seems not to be able to beat the market at any duration. Dedicated 
short seems to be the only strategy to yield positive returns on an average short trade. These deals are 
chosen way better than short selling the market, and on some of the durations (one month and three 
months) the short trades are able to yield larger profits than the market on long side trades. This is in 
line with my hypothesis number 2; it really seems that the dedicated short funds are able to short sell 
profitably and yield arbitrage profits for the information they are gathering. They also seem to be the 
only ones to be able to be profitable with only the short side trade. 
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Table 1 
The table below shows the number of trades, funds and securities in the broad sample (containing all the short positions), narrow sample 
(containing the short positions which had data for all the factor portfolios since FF3 data was only available until 6/2016), short positions over 
2% of the underlying company’s market cap and all the strategy groups excluding number 1, since it only had one fund, one company and two 
deals in it. The table also includes the average annualized return of every sample and the market (the market from both days that some stocks 
were sold short significantly in Finland, both from the broad sample and narrow sample and all trade days) from all the time periods. With these 
one is able to analyse which strategies require long-short portfolios and which can yield profits by themselves. There are no substantial 
differences between the narrow and the broad samples. Therefore the table only shows the data from the broad sample regarding the strategy 
groups, since it is more comprehensive than the narrow sample.  
 
 
 
Broad 
sample
Narrow 
sample
Number of trades 3362 2989
Number of funds 139 126
Number of securities 40 36
Average annual return (1 day), % -23.9 -19.2
Average annual return (1 week), % -24.0 -17.6
Average annual return (1 month), % -24.5 -18.6
Average annual return (3 months), % -15.3 -13.5
Average annual return (6 months), % -14.2 -14.0
Average annual return (1 year), % -12.5 -12.5
Average annual return (2 years), % -11.9 -11.9
Shorts over 
2%
303
19
13
-2.6
3.0
-58.7
-27.7
-13.0
-6.4
-9.4
Strategy 
basket 2
Strategy 
basket 3
Strategy 
basket 4
Strategy 
basket 5
Market on 
short dates 
(Broad)
Market on 
short dates 
(Narrow)
Market on 
all dates 
2012-2017
381 1865 1037 77 N/A N/A N/A
18 70 41 9 N/A N/A N/A
16 37 24 9 N/A N/A N/A
-24.6 -24.0 -30.0 60.2 24.4 24.9 20.0
-72.6 -19.8 -20.3 16.6 24.1 22.9 20.3
-40.5 -21.7 -29.2 36.5 23.5 23.2 21.1
-11.4 -12.6 -24.7 17.2 17.5 18.2 16.5
-20.6 -9.2 -21.9 7.9 16.0 15.9 16.4
-34.1 -5.5 -17.1 2.5 15.3 15.3 15.8
-24.7 -6.2 -16.0 -9.9 17.4 17.4 16.6
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4 Performance 
 
In this chapter I cover my results. First I report the performance of all hedge funds’ short positions. 
Then I cover the results of the strategy groups and finally conclude with the performance of the 
largest short deals. I made three key findings. Firstly, hedge funds’ short trades are on average able 
to beat the market, but they will require a long side trade with them to be profitable. Secondly 
dedicated short funds as well as funds of large wealth management companies are able to beat the 
average hedge fund, and the short trades of dedicated short are even able to beat the market with 
only the short side trade. Thirdly, largest short positions seem to be able to beat the average short 
trade on long and short durations, though not on medium term. 
4.1      All hedge funds  
Table 2 below shows the FF3 and FF3 + Carhart momentum (Carhart, 1997) risk-adjusted returns 
of all short trades over 0.5% of the underlying company’s market cap. All the models cluster the 
standard errors (SE) (see Cameron and Miller, 2015 for more specific explanation of clustering 
SEs) of all deals that are done in the same company and within the same week. F-statistic also 
accounts for the clustering of the model to make the F-statistic robust. The returns are calculated for 
the periods of a day, a week, a month, three months, six months, a year and two years. The returns 
are then regressed using the following formulae:  
        ܴ௧ிிଷெ௢௠ =  ߙ௧ + ߚଵ,௧ܯܭܴܶܨ +  ߚଶ,௧ܵܯܤ + ߚଷ,௧ܪܯܮ + ߚସ,௧ܯܱܯ + ߝ௧ 
 
ܴ௧ிிଷ =  ߙ௧ +  ߚଵ,௧ܯܭܴܶܨ +  ߚଶ,௧ܵܯܤ +  ߚଷ,௧ܪܯܮ +  ߝ௧ 
Where ܴ is the underlying deal’s excess return, ݐ is the forward looking time period, ܯܭܴܶܨ is the 
excess return of the market portfolio, ܵܯܤ is the excess return of the small minus big portfolio, 
ܪܯܮ is the excess return of the high minus low portfolio and ܯܱܯ is the excess return of the 
winner minus loser momentum portfolio. ܵܯܤ, ܪܯܮ and ܯܱܯ are extracted from the European 
data in Kenneth French’s data library. ܯܭܴܶܨ is the excess return of the Finnish return index from 
Thomson Reuters during the period. The excess returns are calculated as: 
ܴ௜ா௫௖௘௦௦ =  ܴ௜ − ܴ݂ 
 
Where ܴ௜ is return of the factor portfolio and ܴ݂ is the risk free return from French’s data library, 
where the risk free rate is the German one-month treasury bill rate. 
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Table 2 shows that returns load on factor portfolios in most of the time periods. From these we can 
see that the funds on average short sell companies with high betas (around 1.2 and 1.3), which 
shows an intention to betting against beta (ܤܣܤ) strategy (See Frazzini and Pedersen, 2014 for 
introduction to ܤܣܤ). It also seems that the funds employ the momentum strategy (see Grinblatt, 
Titman and Wermers, 1995 and Carhart, 1997 for introduction to momentum) and short sell loser 
stocks in it pretty heavily. It refers to the use of the momentum strategy, that almost all of the 
significant alphas disappear when the momentum factor is added to the model. This is in line with 
Baltzer et al. (2015) that informed investors, such as hedge funds, use the momentum strategy. It 
seems that only on a year’s time horizon the funds are able to produce significant positive alphas 
with the FF3 + Carhart momentum risk adjustment.  
When we use the pure FF3 risk adjustment, the market beta seems to remain around 1.2. However, 
ܪܯܮ factor becomes significant and it shows that the funds mostly short sell companies with high 
market-to-book values. The alphas become significant in more cases, which again implies that the 
funds are using momentum strategies. It seems that the funds are able to produce significant 
positive alphas of annualized 7 – 13 percent depending on the time period, but only on time periods 
from one month to one year. This implies that hedge funds are able to predict future returns for this 
1-month to 1-year period and not on a very short (a day or a week) or a very long period (two 
years). This might reveal the duration of hedge funds’ average short positions, and it would be 
intuitive that in these momentum strategies the holding periods are medium term. Since I do not 
have the closing dates of these deals, I am not able to investigate this average duration more 
thoroughly. These results are in line with previous studies (Jank and Smajlbegovic, 2016; Choi et 
al., 2016) both with the time periods and the use of ܤܣܤ and ܯܱܯ strategies. 
These deals are however on average only able to beat the market when using a long-short strategy, 
since the average short trade still produces negative raw returns, though less negative than short 
selling the market portfolio. On the other hand, we can say that on average, the investors should not 
choose the significantly short sold stocks in their own portfolios as long positions, since being long 
in the market portfolio pays better. 
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Table 2, Full sample 
This table shows the factor loadings and t-statistics for each factor portfolio and the alpha. Also robustness metrics are included in the table. 
 
Full sample (FF3 + Carhart momentum) 
  
Full sample (FF3) 
Daily Weekly Monthly 3 month 6 month Yearly 2 year
⍺ 2.54 1.27 4.47 -0.45 -1.98 16.22** 3.62
(0.18) (0.13) (0.85) (-0.14) (-0.63) (2.53) (0.14)
MKTRF -1.31*** -1.21*** -1.34*** -1.24*** -1.31*** -0.8*** -0.54
(-16.44) (-16.2) (-13.62) (-12.4) (-10.97) (-3.73) (-0.73)
SMB -0.52*** -0.44*** -0.63*** -1.4*** -1.96*** -0.05 3.06
(-2.89) (-2.58) (-2.87) (-5.76) (-6.55) (-0.08) (1.46)
HML -0.51*** -0.23 -0.03 0.21 0.5** -0.02 -0.48
(-3.44) (-1.12) (-0.14) (1.06) (2.29) (-0.1) (-0.41)
WML 0.53*** 0.64*** 0.82*** 1.59*** 2.15*** -0.61 -0.96
(4.12) (3.94) (4.84) (10.36) (10.25) (-1.15) (-0.88)
25.91 26.06 25.72 29.51 20.93 6.81 6.28
N 2988 2974 2946 2839 2583 2082 1255
F 134.67 77.18 58.78 82.7 65.74 8.13 4.44
Pr(F) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
N of unique stocks 36 36 36 36 35 32 25
Daily Weekly Monthly 3 month 6 month Yearly 2 year
⍺ 7.07 6.87 10.91** 7.06** 11.19*** 12.98** -12.25
(0.48) (0.71) (2.08) (1.99) (3.24) (2.32) (-0.51)
MKTRF -1.27*** -1.18*** -1.29*** -1.13*** -1.03*** -0.89*** -0.4
(-16.53) (-15.82) (-13.04) (-10.21) (-7.68) (-4.24) (-0.53)
SMB -0.46*** -0.28* -0.33 -0.17 -0.32 -0.62 3.12
(-2.59) (-1.74) (-1.55) (-0.71) (-1.12) (-1.62) (1.47)
HML -0.85*** -0.64*** -0.48*** -0.65*** -0.06 0.06 -0.72
(-5.42) (-3.67) (-2.61) (-3.62) (-0.29) (0.26) (-0.61)
25.2 24.83 23.62 21.56 11.07 6.59 6.11
N 2988 2974 2946 2839 2583 2082 1255
F-value 175.79 95.25 72.1 48.89 27.53 10.60 5.67
Pr(F) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
N of unique stocks 36 36 36 36 35 32 25
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4.2      Systematic equity 
Table 3 shows the models’ results with the data sample from systematic equity. This strategy does 
not require picking stocks that outperform the market. My hypothesis is that these funds do not 
make alphas as high as the average hedge fund. When looking at the return data without risk 
adjustments, it seems that the hypothesis is in place and the systematic equity funds are unable to 
pick better short trades than it would have been to just short sell the market. 
The risk-adjusted data shows that systematic equity short sells stocks with even higher betas than 
the average fund (betas on average between 1.4 and 1.9 depending on the time frame), which 
implies that they are pursuing the betting against beta strategy even more aggressively than the 
average hedge fund. Also Jank and Smajlbegovic (2016) found that hedge funds use the BAB 
strategy in their short trades, so this finding is in line with previous research. It also seems that they 
are exploiting the momentum strategy a bit more aggressively than the average hedge fund. The 
FF3 model without the momentum factor also shows that these funds are short selling high market-
to-book companies more than the average fund. This phenomenon however disappears when 
including the momentum factor in the model. 
The risk-adjusted data indicates that these hedge funds are unable to beat the market with these risk 
adjustments, since the alphas are mostly insignificant, and even when significant, they are negative 
(duration of 6 months). This is in line with my hypothesis number 2; since these funds do not trade 
with stock picking information, they also do not produce abnormal returns with these short 
positions.  
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Table 3, Systematic equity 
This table shows the factor loadings and t-statistics for each factor portfolio and the alpha. Also robustness metrics are included in the table. 
 
Systematic equity (FF3 + Carhart momentum) 
 
 
Systematic equity (FF3) 
Daily Weekly Monthly 3 month 6 month Yearly 2 year
⍺ -29.92 -25.15 -1.58 -11.45 -25.25*** 12.58 33.32
(-0.75) (-1.19) (-0.11) (-1.32) (-3.75) (1.09) (0.86)
MKTRF -1.39*** -1.51*** -1.88*** -1.57*** -1.75*** -1.79*** -3.99***
(-9.17) (-7.15) (-8.9) (-6.59) (-8.93) (-4.96) (-3.22)
SMB 0.02 -0.62 -1.39** -1.21** -2.28*** -2.46** 0.12
(0.04) (-1.46) (-2.38) (-2.42) (-4.56) (-2.49) (0.03)
HML -0.2 -0.29 -0.32 -0.97* -1.49*** -0.71* 1.22
(-0.51) (-0.5) (-0.76) (-1.75) (-3) (-1.69) (0.59)
WML 1.05*** 1.27*** 1.38*** 1.76*** 2.6*** 0.29 1.61
(2.83) (3.03) (3.64) (4.32) (6.69) (0.31) (0.88)
29.74 36.72 37.68 44.32 53.25 38.49 49.51
N 354 354 352 342 300 180 81
F 29.42 19.48 27.43 40.18 61.27 13.29 18.76
Pr(F) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
N of unique stocks 16 16 16 16 14 14 13
Daily Weekly Monthly 3 month 6 month Yearly 2 year
⍺ -26.75 -22.58 -1.16 -13.7 -19.93** 14.35 50.04
(-0.65) (-1.03) (-0.08) (-1.37) (-2.52) (1.5) (1.56)
MKTRF -1.36*** -1.47*** -1.78*** -1.36*** -1.27*** -1.76*** -4.16***
(-9.18) (-6.83) (-8.11) (-5) (-5.02) (-5.09) (-3.29)
SMB 0.04 -0.41 -0.6 0.34 0.17 -2.19*** 0.4
(0.08) (-0.96) (-1.04) (0.53) (0.28) (-3.44) (0.12)
HML -1.1** -1.5*** -1.48*** -2.39*** -2.66*** -0.73* 1.65
(-2.23) (-3.01) (-3.15) (-5.44) (-5.84) (-1.76) (0.81)
28.08 33.5 34.1 38.56 41.77 38.79 49.54
N 354 354 352 342 300 180 81
F-value 36.83 23.11 30.63 34.8 30.47 17.65 23.69
Pr(F) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
N of unique stocks 16 16 16 16 14 14 13
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4.3      Large wealth management companies’ funds 
Table 4 shows the models’ results with the data sample from strategy group 3. This strategy group 
contains the residual of the funds in my data; meaning that I put here everything that I was unable to 
put in any of the other groups. This group mostly contains large wealth management companies’, 
like Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley, funds which can employ any kind of strategy. I find that 
over 90% of the funds in this basket are these large wealth management companies’ funds, and this 
is great enough of a number to generalize this attribute to the whole group. 
From the raw return data we can see that the large wealth management companies’ funds are able to 
beat the market, but they however require a long-short strategy to perform because the return of the 
average short trade is still negative, even though less negative than short selling the market 
portfolio. The risk-adjusted models show that betting against beta strategy seems to have a smaller 
role in these funds, but it still seems to be a trend to mostly short sell securities with high betas (in 
range of 1.1 and 1.25 in this sample). The winner minus loser factor seems again to be very high, 
which shows that these funds use momentum strategy and short sell the loser stocks. This seems to 
be common for all of these strategy groups and is aligned with Baltzer et al. (2015), who state that 
informed investors are the users of momentum. The alpha seems to be quite high and consistent in 
the FF3 model, but when adding the momentum factor, the alpha diminishes from all durations 
except one year. The FF3 alphas seem quite high, between 7 and 16 percent annually.  
To sum up, it seems that these funds mostly trade with betting against beta and winner minus loser 
momentum strategies, but on a one-year time period, it seems that they are able to produce 
abnormal alphas even with the FF3 + Carhart momentum risk adjustment. 
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Table 4, Large wealth management companies’ funds 
This table shows the factor loadings and t-statistics for each factor portfolio and the alpha. Also robustness metrics are included in the table. 
 
Large wealth management companies’ funds (FF3 + Carhart momentum) 
 
 
Large wealth management companies’ funds (FF3) 
Daily Weekly Monthly 3 month 6 month Yearly 2 year
⍺ 3.45 3.36 3.25 1.62 1.77 21.03*** 27.63
(0.21) (0.31) (0.55) (0.49) (0.53) (3.89) (1.35)
MKTRF -1.19*** -1.12*** -1.25*** -1.21*** -1.09*** -0.65*** -0.38
(-15.85) (-14.02) (-12.31) (-11.95) (-8.28) (-3.21) (-0.64)
SMB -0.43** -0.35* -0.5** -1.29*** -1.38*** 0.69 2.15
(-2.29) (-1.85) (-2.15) (-4.73) (-3.87) (1.23) (1.07)
HML -0.67*** -0.38* 0.16 0.43** 0.83*** 0.16 -0.26
(-3.63) (-1.84) (0.73) (2.23) (4.45) (0.66) (-0.27)
WML 0.51*** 0.41** 0.86*** 1.57*** 1.92*** -0.97** -2.85***
(3.37) (2.39) (4.71) (10.37) (9.33) (-2.35) (-2.83)
27.33 100 25.79 32.52 21.06 7.52 5.90
N 1594 1585 1560 1493 1346 1061 597
F 94.97 170530872048.06 48.62 67.99 40.82 11.94 5.35
Pr(F) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
N of unique stocks 32 32 32 32 29 26 17
Daily Weekly Monthly 3 month 6 month Yearly 2 year
⍺ 7.32 7.06 10.13* 8.61** 11.19*** 15.83*** -12.72
(0.44) (0.67) (1.73) (2.18) (3.02) (2.98) (-0.65)
MKTRF -1.15*** -1.11*** -1.19*** -1.11*** -0.8*** -0.8*** 0
(-16.15) (-13.92) (-11.54) (-9.83) (-5.77) (-4.24) (0)
SMB -0.37** -0.25 -0.17 0 0.27 -0.19 2.12
(-2.04) (-1.35) (-0.73) (-0.01) (0.84) (-0.48) (0.99)
HML -1.03*** -0.66*** -0.34* -0.45** 0.22 0.3 -0.87
(-5.68) (-3.54) (-1.75) (-2.46) (1.19) (1.26) (-0.99)
26.55 100 23.37 23.69 10.26 6.69 3.15
N 1594 1585 1560 1493 1346 1061 597
F-value 126.94 214013452460.49 57.48 46.71 24.35 13.38 2.68
Pr(F) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05
N of unique stocks 32 32 32 32 29 26 17
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4.4      Long-short equity 
Table 5 represents the results from long-short equity strategies, which should be able to perform 
with short trades that have negative returns, but less negative than short selling the market. When 
examining the data without the risk adjustments, it seems that these deals are unable to outperform 
the market. This might however be about the risk profile of the deals executed by long-short equity 
funds. 
The risk-adjusted data shows that the deals really have at least more market risk than the average 
deal (betas mostly between 1.1 and 1.4). This indicates that the funds are using the betting against 
beta strategy quite aggressively. It seems that this is very popular among hedge funds’ short trades. 
The small minus big factor seems mostly significant, and it shows that these funds mostly short sell 
small companies. This might however be about the characteristics of Finnish companies, since 
OMXH as basis, the companies are really quite large (average market cap over EUR 4 billion). The 
winner minus loser factor shows again that the momentum strategy is used and the funds short sell 
loser stocks. Over the average market risk (high betas) however does not seem to be enough to 
make these deals profitable since, though the alphas are mostly positive, they seem to remain 
mostly insignificant and at least these deals seem to lose to the average hedge fund short trade. This 
is against my hypothesis number 2, but it might also be so that the large wealth management 
companies’ funds are able to outperform the smaller hedge funds even when they are trading in the 
smaller hedge funds’ core business, since they can invest more in data gathering and therefore 
produce even larger abnormal arbitrage returns. This outperformance of larger funds was also 
discovered by Jank and Smajlbegovic (2016). 
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Table 5, Long-short equity 
This table shows the factor loadings and t-statistics for each factor portfolio and the alpha. Also robustness metrics are included in the table. 
 
Long-short equity (FF3 + Carhart momentum) 
 
 
Long-short equity (FF3) 
Daily Weekly Monthly 3 month 6 month Yearly 2 year
⍺ 8.25 6.06 5.58 -1.46 -2.53 9.17 -58
(0.42) (0.45) (0.81) (-0.36) (-0.63) (0.91) (-1.23)
MKTRF -1.43*** -1.24*** -1.29*** -1.18*** -1.34*** -0.81** 0.2
(-8.07) (-11.08) (-8.7) (-8.53) (-8.28) (-2.51) (0.2)
SMB -0.76** -0.44* -0.7** -1.85*** -2.38*** -0.67 4.15
(-2.17) (-1.71) (-2.34) (-5.2) (-6.48) (-0.84) (1.54)
HML -0.33 -0.09 -0.24 0.36 0.62** -0.09 -1.68
(-1.55) (-0.33) (-0.85) (1.31) (1.96) (-0.28) (-1.01)
WML 0.34** 0.62*** 0.45** 1.28*** 1.85*** -0.25 0.56
(1.98) (2.7) (2.04) (6.14) (6.91) (-0.32) (0.44)
28.33 22.64 21.11 21.32 15.46 4.85 5.78
N 965 962 959 929 869 781 525
F 56.41 36.54 25.48 30.23 28.93 2.93 3.37
Pr(F) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.01
N of unique stocks 23 23 23 23 23 22 20
Daily Weekly Monthly 3 month 6 month Yearly 2 year
⍺ 12.27 12.57 9.55 6.59 11.89*** 7.89 -40.16
(0.62) (0.92) (1.32) (1.49) (2.78) (0.94) (-1.01)
MKTRF -1.41*** -1.19*** -1.27*** -1.11*** -1.16*** -0.85** 0.11
(-8.14) (-10.61) (-8.63) (-7.71) (-6.75) (-2.54) (0.1)
SMB -0.7** -0.27 -0.6** -1.04*** -1.36*** -0.91* 4.09
(-2.06) (-1.12) (-2.1) (-3.14) (-4.27) (-1.78) (1.5)
HML -0.49** -0.39 -0.42 -0.19 0.42 -0.05 -1.53
(-2.44) (-1.6) (-1.62) (-0.79) (1.36) (-0.16) (-0.9)
28.05 21.66 20.53 16.17 9.60 4.94 5.88
N 965 962 959 929 869 781 525
F-value 75.7 41.5 32 20.08 15.89 3.76 4.24
Pr(F) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01
N of unique stocks 23 23 23 23 23 22 20
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4.5      Dedicated short 
In Table 6 we have the results of dedicated short strategies. The amount of data is limited in this 
sample (about 70 deals, nine funds and under ten companies). This makes the robustness metrics a 
bit lower (all the F-statistics do not fit within the 95% confidence level, ܴଶs are a bit lower than in 
the other groups) than in the other samples. The non-risk-adjusted returns of dedicated short show 
that the average deal is even able to produce higher returns with the pure short position than being 
long in the market portfolio in some durations (one to three months), which implies that these short 
trades do not even require a long side deal with them to be profitable.  
It is more challenging to interpret the risk-adjusted results because of the amount of data, but we 
can still see a slight trend to betting against beta strategies. This is however not as consistent as it is 
in the other strategy groups. The results seem to be loading on the momentum factor, which shows 
that the funds are exploiting the winner minus loser momentum strategy quite aggressively. This 
seems to be the main way to make profits for these funds, since the alphas seem to diminish in the 
model that includes the Carhart momentum. This is in line with Baltzer et al. (2015) who state that 
informed investors use the momentum strategy. However the performance on a short time period 
seems abnormal (between a day and a month), even with the momentum risk adjustment, though the 
alphas are insignificant in other than the one-month period. In the plain FF3 model, it seems that 
these deals are highly profitable from 1 day to 6 months, though the alpha is only significant in the 
one month and 6 month durations. 
To sum this up, these funds are using the same betting against beta and winner minus loser 
strategies as other hedge funds, but they are also able to produce high annualized alphas on short 
time periods, more accurately between 1 day and one month when using the FF3 + Carhart 
momentum risk adjustment. This is in line with my hypothesis number 2; informed investors should 
make abnormal profits with their costly information.  
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Table 6, Dedicated short 
This table shows the factor loadings and t-statistics for each factor portfolio and the alpha. Also robustness metrics are included in the table. 
 
Dedicated short (FF3 + Carhart momentum) 
 
 
Dedicated short (FF3) 
Daily Weekly Monthly 3 month 6 month Yearly 2 year
⍺ 173.46 72.79 54.66* -6.24 15 -81.23 47.04
(0.6) (0.91) (1.75) (-0.3) (0.43) (-1.49) (0.37)
MKTRF -1.32*** -1.02** -0.97** -0.29 -1.92** 3.58* -3.76
(-3.04) (-2.17) (-2.47) (-0.38) (-2.16) (1.74) (-1.07)
SMB -1.44 -0.45 0.27 -0.06 -5.75*** 2.93 4.72
(-1.2) (-0.6) (0.24) (-0.04) (-2.95) (0.8) (0.25)
HML -0.42 0.69 -0.42 -1.07 0.19 -4.21** 3.76
(-0.43) (0.96) (-0.75) (-1.12) (0.15) (-2.53) (0.74)
WML -0.25 1.26** 1.14* 2.33*** 3.33** -0.66 1.95
(-0.18) (2.04) (1.85) (3.08) (2.26) (-0.24) (0.35)
0 3.05 27.45 22.20 23.37 7.64 7.21
N 70 70 70 70 63 55 48
F 4.48 2.35 6.17 4.04 3.33 2.31 2.07
Pr(F) 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.07 0.1
N of unique stocks 8 8 8 8 7 6 5
Daily Weekly Monthly 3 month 6 month Yearly 2 year
⍺ 159.19 87.4 76.46** 15.78 81.66*** -82.64 76.24
(0.52) (1) (2.39) (0.66) (2.66) (-1.56) (0.9)
MKTRF -1.34*** -0.97* -0.91** -0.08 -2.05** 3.43* -4.38
(-3.51) (-1.98) (-2.29) (-0.1) (-2.35) (1.71) (-1.3)
SMB -1.45 -0.26 0.4 1.23 -4.13** 2.09 0.84
(-1.22) (-0.33) (0.35) (0.73) (-2.16) (0.87) (0.05)
HML -0.3 0.15 -0.98* -2.02* -0.15 -4.12** 4.42
(-0.39) (0.23) (-1.99) (-1.97) (-0.12) (-2.56) (0.94)
0.99 1.25 25.11 11.32 17.14 9.27 8.82
N 70 70 70 70 63 55 48
F-value 4.53 1.34 6.04 1.94 2.40 3.24 2.68
Pr(F) 0.01 0.27 0.00 0.13 0.08 0.03 0.06
N of unique stocks 8 8 8 8 7 6 5
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4.6      Largest short positions 
Table 7 shows the results of a sample that contains only short positions that are over 2% of the 
underlying company’s market value. I study this to see if the magnitude of the short position is a 
factor that tells something about the position’s performance. It could be so that the size of the 
position tells about the certainty of the hedge fund that the underlying company is overvalued. This 
would indicate that the larger short trades should be even more profitable than the average short 
trade. 
When examining the non-risk-adjusted results, it seems that the larger deals are able to beat the 
average short trade in very short (one day and one week) and very long durations (six months and 
one year). However, on medium term (one month to three months) it seems that these deals are 
losing to the average short trade. This implies that either these deals are made for a very long or a 
very short time period, or that they are not performing better than the average short trade.  
The risk-adjusted results show that these funds bet against beta (betas between 1.2 and 1.7 in 12/14 
tests). It seems that this strategy is exploited more aggressively in these large trades than in the 
average short trade. The winner minus loser factor loading shows that also the momentum strategy 
is exploited more aggressively with these large deals than with the average deal (values of 0.8 to 3.6 
compared to 0.5 to 2). The alphas are significant only on the one-year time period but there they 
seem to be higher than in the average short trade. We can also see high but statistically insignificant 
alphas in the short time periods, more accurately from one day to one week. 
To recap, it seems that the large deals exploit the betting against beta and the winner minus loser 
momentum strategies more aggressively than the average deal. It also seems that these deals are 
able to produce higher risk-adjusted alphas on very short (one day to one week) and very long (one 
year) durations, however only the one year alpha being significant. These deals seem to lose to the 
average short trade on medium term (from one month to three months.) 
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Table 7, Largest short positions 
This table shows the factor loadings and t-statistics for each factor portfolio and the alpha. Also robustness metrics are included in the table. 
 
All short positions over 2% of the underlying company market cap (FF3 + Carhart momentum) 
 
 
All short positions over 2% of the underlying company market cap (FF3) 
 
Daily Weekly Monthly 3 month 6 month Yearly 2 year
⍺ 26.2 28.55 -13.37 -23.76** -21.86* 30.12** 14.76
(0.62) (0.92) (-0.89) (-2.39) (-1.93) (2) (0.29)
MKTRF -1.35*** -1.21*** -1.36*** -0.9*** -1.71*** -1.76*** -1.42
(-6.72) (-6.53) (-6.14) (-4.27) (-4.58) (-3.14) (-0.96)
SMB -1** -1.2** -1.17* -1.31* -1.69** -1.67 5.04
(-2.13) (-2.42) (-1.89) (-1.75) (-2.01) (-1.09) (1.04)
HML -0.44 0.62* 0.13 0.3 0.97 1.44** -0.16
(-0.96) (1.8) (0.32) (0.64) (1.47) (2.34) (-0.06)
WML 0.79* 1.35*** 1.07*** 2.55*** 3.62*** 0.43 0.32
(1.95) (3.81) (2.75) (7.91) (7.48) (0.37) (0.13)
24.1 24.69 26.6 32.18 27.19 6.1 10.01
N 271 268 265 250 228 204 142
F 14.93 14.47 13.31 30.77 19.49 2.82 3.09
Pr(F) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.02
N of unique stocks 11 11 11 11 10 9 7
Daily Weekly Monthly 3 month 6 month Yearly 2 year
⍺ 23.71 48.11 -3.52 1.01 18.98 31.26** 20.48
(0.56) (1.49) (-0.23) (0.09) (1.48) (2.21) (0.48)
MKTRF -1.32*** -1.16*** -1.25*** -0.94*** -1.34*** -1.66*** -1.51
(-6.67) (-6.02) (-5) (-3.76) (-2.74) (-3.07) (-0.97)
SMB -1.03** -1.08** -1 -0.44 -0.17 -1.17 4.74
(-2.18) (-2.02) (-1.54) (-0.47) (-0.18) (-1.18) (0.92)
HML -0.94** -0.04 -0.4 -0.35 0.48 1.35** -0.04
(-2.06) (-0.11) (-1.06) (-0.67) (0.56) (2.2) (-0.02)
22.58 18.98 19.79 13.13 9.77 6.46 10.64
N 271 268 265 250 228 204 142
F-value 19.94 12.28 10.01 8.23 4.83 3.57 4.11
Pr(F) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01
N of unique stocks 11 11 11 11 10 9 7
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5 Conclusion 
Hedge funds are on average able to choose companies that produce higher returns in short positions 
than short selling the market portfolio on time periods between one month and one year, but they 
are not on average able to find short trades with positive raw returns. This implies that the funds are 
perhaps using the short trades to hedge away the market risk and use long-short strategies to yield 
high risk-adjusted returns. It also seems that the funds are on average able to produce high FF3 risk-
adjusted alphas, though some of the statistical significance disappears when adding the winner 
minus loser momentum factor in the model. This is in line with my hypothesis number 1 and the 
theory (Grossman, 1981) that informed traders make abnormal profits with their costly information.  
It seems that the funds are exploiting betting against beta and winner minus loser momentum 
strategies to achieve these high risk-adjusted returns. This is in line with Baltzer et al. (2015) who 
state that informed investors use the momentum strategy. 
The division to strategy groups reveals that the funds that generally do not employ stock picking 
strategies, like systematic equity, seem to not be able to pick stocks that would perform worse than 
the market. It seems that the hedge funds that are able to produce the highest risk-adjusted and non-
risk-adjusted returns are dedicated short funds. These funds seem to be the only ones that are able to 
on average produce positive returns with only the short side trade, and within some time periods 
(one to three months) are even able to beat the market’s long position’s return by raw returns with 
just the short side trade. The other high performing funds are large wealth management companies’ 
funds, which can employ any strategy. These funds are able to choose short positions that are better 
than short selling the market. They are not however able to choose deals that on average would 
produce positive raw returns on the short side. This implies that these funds have to use a long-short 
strategy to yield the profits they want, and also use the short side trades to hedge away the market 
risk. I also notice that the funds in these strategy groups use the winner minus loser momentum and 
betting against beta strategies. However the alphas of the dedicated short funds still remain high 
(though mostly insignificant due to the low amount of data in the sub-sample) when taking the 
aforementioned strategies to consideration. These findings support my hypothesis number 2 and the 
theory that the informed investors using costly information are able to yield arbitrage returns 
(Grossman, 1981). 
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The largest short positions relative to the market value of the company seem to yield higher profits 
than the average short trade on very short (one day to one week) or long (one year) time periods, 
but not on the medium term periods. These deals exploit the winner minus loser momentum and 
betting against beta strategies even more aggressively than the average fund. 
The results can be summarized into three key findings. Firstly, hedge funds are on average able to 
produce high risk-adjusted returns with their short trades and beat the market with them, secondly, 
dedicated short funds as well as funds of large wealth management companies are able to execute 
better short side trades than the other hedge funds and thirdly, larger short positions yield higher 
profits on short and long (though not on medium term) durations, which shows that funds short sell 
more aggressively when having more significant information about the underlying company. The 
funds seem to be able to make high risk-adjusted returns with mostly betting against beta and 
winner minus loser momentum strategies, though the alpha still remains significant in some cases 
when considering these strategies. These imply that when choosing their own portfolio, other 
investors should evade the securities that hedge funds are short selling, especially the ones that are 
sold short by either large wealth management companies’ funds or dedicated short funds. It could 
also be a fine strategy to follow these short positions to yield high risk-adjusted returns since they 
are reported on a daily basis in the EU. 
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Hedge fund strategy data 
EU Article 9 of Regulation No 236/2012 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32012R0236 
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